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Only about one-fifth of respondents in the Reuters/University of Michigan survey report that the 
2008 tax rebates led them to mostly increase spending, while over half said it would lead them to mostly 
pay off debt.  Of those in the mostly-spend category, the response was swift, with over 80 percent 
reporting increasing their spending within three months of receiving their rebate.  Older households, 
households with higher wealth and higher income, and those expecting future income growth were 
generally more likely to spend the rebates.  A review of other surveys confirms the general pattern of 
results and suggests that small changes in survey design do not have a major effect on the distribution of 
responses. 
The distribution of survey answers corresponds to an aggregate MPC after one year of about one-
third.  The paper combines this survey-based estimate of the MPC and the survey-based estimate of the 
timing of spending to show that the rebates help explain the aggregate movements in saving, spending, 
and debt in 2008. Because the rebate was large and distributed over a short period, it had a non-trivial 
effect on total spending in the second and third quarters of 2008.  Nonetheless, the results imply that the 
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1.  Introduction 
Since the start of the recession in early 2008, various measures have been enacted with the aim of 
stimulating consumer spending.  These include one-time stimulus payments, lowered income tax 
withholding, and extended unemployment benefits.   These actions have renewed the debate among 
policymakers and academics about the effects of fiscal stimulus and, in particular, the impact on 
aggregate spending of the alternative policies.  The life-cycle/permanent income theory suggests that, in 
response to such temporary increases in income, consumers should increase their spending only by the 
annuity value of the one-time stimulus payments. Indeed, under Ricardian equivalence forward-looking 
households might not increase their spending at all because they anticipate the future tax increases needed 
to offset the countercyclical tax decreases. Thus, the increase in spending in any given quarter due to 
stimulus payments or other temporary boosts to income from fiscal policy might be small.  For a variety 
of reasons—including borrowing constraints, myopia, preferences that are biased toward present 
consumption, and rule-of-thumb spending of current income—households might, however, spend a larger 
fraction of a temporary boost to income.  Indeed, analyses of similar government programs in the past 
using a variety of methodological approaches have generally found a non-trivial positive marginal 
propensity to consume (MPC).  The exact magnitude and timing of the spending response to a temporary 
boost to income have not been settled. Moreover, the MPC might vary across individuals or depend on 
prevailing economic conditions.  Especially now that such polices have become common in 
countercyclical economic policy, it is valuable to study the effects of different episodes of economic 
policy. 
In this paper, we estimate the effects on consumer spending of the $96 billion in one-time 
stimulus payments that households received as part of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 beginning in 
late April of 2008.  Although these stimulus payments were not directly tied to tax liabilities, we will 
follow the common parlance and refer to them as “tax rebates.” Of those eligible, single individuals 
received between $300 and $600, and married couples received between $600 and $1,200.  Those with 
dependent children received an additional $300 per child.  A broad group of households—those with an 
income tax liability or those with at least $3,000 of qualifying income—were eligible for the 2008 rebate.  
Qualifying income included forms of income that are not fully taxable, such as Social Security benefits. 
The rebate was phased out at higher income levels by reducing the payment by 5 percent of any income 
above $75,000 for single filers and $150,000 for joint filers and was first applied to any outstanding   2
federal debts (such as student loans and child support).
1  In total, about 120 million individuals received a 
rebate in 2008. Treasury distributed the rebates electronically (direct deposit) if it had taxpayer bank 
account information.  Otherwise, it mailed a paper check.   Conditional on the form of the payment, the 
exact timing of the payment depended on the recipient’s Social Security number.  The payments, in 
particular the electronic fund transfers, were distributed quickly.
2   Before the payments, all eligible 
households were sent a letter from the U.S. Treasury stating the amount of their forthcoming rebate.  
Figure 1 shows the total amount of rebate income paid out by Treasury each month in 2008.
3  These 
stimulus payments were large and were disbursed quite quickly.  They amounted to approximately 0.8 
percent of 2008 personal income and 8.7 percent of 2008 Federal personal tax payments.  Most of the 
payments were disbursed in May and June. 
We analyze responses from households in the Reuters/University of Michigan Survey of 
Consumers to study the effects of the 2008 rebates.  In particular, households were asked whether “the tax 
rebate [will] lead you mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt?”  
The survey includes questions designed to characterize the type of spending or debt repayment and the 
timing of spending, as well as assess the validity of the survey responses. In summary, the survey results 
suggest that roughly one-third of the rebate income was spent in 2008 and that the spending response was 
concentrated in the first few months after receipt. We also show that the survey-based estimates of rebate 
spending are consistent with aggregate data on spending and debt. 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we explore the survey responses—the 
basic response patterns, systematic variation across households, and the translation of the survey 
responses to aggregate effects.  Section 3 then examines the survey-based estimates in the context of 
                                                      
1 Technically, the rebates were a credit for tax year 2008, but to expedite the payments, the rebate amount was 
estimated (in terms of eligibility and for the purpose of calculating the high-income phase out) using 2007 taxable 
income.  If actual income in a 2008 tax return implied a higher rebate value, then the difference was paid out to the 
individual (or applied to any tax liabilities from the 2008 return). Individuals who were “overpaid” based on their 
2007 income did not have to repay the excess amount of their rebate. 
2 For tax returns processed by the IRS by April 15 for which the IRS had a private electronic routing number—and 
not one for a tax preparation firm—rebates were distributed via direct deposit by May 16 (i.e., over a three-week 
period ).  The distribution of rebates via paper check began in the final week of the direct deposit distribution and 
was completed by July 11 (a nine-week period). 
3 There was also a tax rebate during the 2001 recession.  The 2001 rebates differed from the 2008 rebates in several 
ways.  In 2001, the tax rebates were “advanced payments” of $300 for singles and $600 for couples that 
corresponded to the benefit of a new 10 percent income bracket.  Hence, the 2001 rebates were linked to tax 
liabilities and for the most part only went to individuals with tax liabilities.  The 2001 rebates went to a smaller 
fraction of the population, were smaller in aggregate relative to the size of the economy, and were not phased out for 
high-income individuals.   The 2001 rebates were distributed by check over a 10-week period, so their disbursement 
was more spread out over time than in 2008.  As in 2008, the paper checks in 2001 were mailed out based on the 
recipient’s Social Security number.   
   3
aggregate statistics and uses a standard consumption model to assess the counterfactual level of spending 
in the absence of rebates.  In Section 4 we discuss other survey evidence on the behavioral response to the 
2008 rebates.  The final section concludes and offers some general remarks on fiscal policy and the role 
of the rebates in the pattern of aggregate demand in 2008.  
 
2.  Survey Evidence on the Spending Response to the 2008 Rebates 
In this section, we discuss the responses to questions we fielded in the Reuters/University of Michigan 
Survey of Consumers.
4  Similar questions have been used to study the changes in income tax withholding 
in 1992 (Shapiro and Slemrod, 1995) and the income tax rebates of 2001 (Shapiro and Slemrod, 2003a, 
2003b).  We fielded questions pertaining to the 2008 economic stimulus payments in February through 
June 2008, and again in November and December 2008.  Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) present an analysis 
of the February through June 2008 survey results.  This paper will focus on the November and December 
2008 results, but also brings to bear evidence from the surveys in the first half of 2008.   
 
2.1  Patterns in November and December Michigan Survey  
The key survey questions in the November and December 2008 survey are as follows.  First, the policy is 
explained to the respondent and then the respondent is asked whether the respondent has received the 
payment.  The question module begins as follows: 
Under the economic stimulus program, tax rebates were sent to most individuals earlier 
this year. In most cases, the tax rebate was six hundred dollars for individuals and twelve 
hundred dollars for married couples. Those with dependent children received an 
additional three hundred dollars per child. Individuals earning more than seventy-five 
thousand dollars and married couples earning more than one hundred fifty thousand 
dollars got smaller tax rebates or no rebate at all.  
Did you (or your family) receive a tax rebate? 
 
Then, if the respondent indicated having received the payment, the respondent is asked the following: 
                                                      
4 The Reuters/Michigan survey is a nationally representative monthly survey based on about 500 telephone 
interviews.  Individuals who are selected for the survey are interviewed twice, six months apart, so that in any given 
month about 60 percent of the respondents are first-time interviewees and about 40 percent are second-time 
interviewees.     4
Thinking about your family’s financial situation this year, did the tax rebate lead you 
mostly to increase spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt? 
Note that, because of its retrospective nature, this series of questions in the November and December 
2008 surveys has a slightly different structure than the series of questions asked in the first half of 2008.  
In the February through June implementations of the survey, there is a single question that introduces the 
policy and asks about mostly spending/saving/paying debt.  Respondents are coded as not receiving the 
rebate only if they volunteer that fact.  The differences in the survey design appear to affect the number 
who report not receiving the rebate but seem to have little effect on the reported spending rates.
5 
  Table 1 gives the basic results for the household response to the 2008 economic stimulus 
payments. Across all months of the survey, roughly one-fifth of rebate recipients report that the rebate led 
them to mostly increase their spending.  In November and December, nearly the same fraction said that 
they increased their saving. The modal response—accounting for over half of responses overall—was that 
receiving the payments led people mostly to pay down debt.
6  This finding conveys the central message of 
this research.  The economic stimulus payments were largely saved or used to pay down debt and 
therefore only provided a modest impetus to aggregate spending per dollar of rebate income.  The percent 
of respondents reporting that they would mostly spend the stimulus payment is quite similar to the 
responses concerning the advance payments (tax rebates) in 2001; Shapiro and Slemrod (2003a, 2003b) 
report a “mostly spend” rate also of about one-fifth from the advance payments.   
Table 1 shows some small differences in the results across months of the survey.  Notably, 
though, the headline result concerning the mostly spend rate shows almost no difference across the 
surveys.  Given that this statistic is of central concern to our analysis and more generally to the 
macroeconomic effects of the policy, the consistency of the results across the months of the survey is 
reassuring.  As already mentioned, the November-December results show a slight increase in the rate of 
mostly paying debt at the expense of mostly saving.
7  There are, though, non-trivial differences in the 
number of individuals reporting not receiving the payment:  in November-December 19 percent of 
respondents report not receiving a rebate versus about half that rate in May-June and an even lower rate 
                                                      
5 The exact wording of the questions in the surveys is available in the Appendix.   
6 Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) report results for the February to June surveys based on tabulations of unweighted 
responses.  Here we use the household head weights provided by Reuters/Michigan survey.  The differences 
between weighted and unweighted results are very small.  For example, the mostly spend rate for February through 
June reported by Shapiro and Slemrod is 19.9 percent unweighted and 19.6 percent weighted.  The weighting 
scheme assigns a weight of zero to respondents who are not heads or spouses/partners of heads.  It also adjusts for 
the number of telephone lines in the household; because the survey is random digit dial, households with more than 
one line are overrepresented in the unweighted sample. 
7 There are no important differences in the responses in November versus December, so we pool them throughout.   5
earlier in the year.  In part, individuals may have learned that they were not receiving the rebate.  Also, 
the November-December surveys (unlike the earlier surveys) explicitly asked about receipt of the rebate 
which likely contributed to the differences in the results.  Since we are interested in the direct effect of the 
rebate it makes sense to focus only on those households who actually received a rebate.  We focus on the 
November and December 2008 results for most of the paper both because of this slight difference in 
question design and because these surveys contain a number of questions aimed at understanding the 
nature and timing of the spending of the stimulus payment. 
The distribution of the three possible response categories and of the follow-up question about the 
timing of the spending do not map directly to an aggregate spending effect—that is, the total amount of 
the rebate spent at various points in time.  But under some further assumptions about the underlying 
distribution of the individual marginal propensities to consume (as used in Shapiro and Slemrod (2003b) 
and described in Section 2.3), the result that 22 percent of respondents say that they mostly increased 
spending yields an aggregate MPC of approximately one-third.  Thus, with rebates totaling $96 billion, 
these results suggest that about $32 billion of extra spending was generated in 2008. 
2.1.1.  Test-Retest Reliability of Responses 
About 40 percent of our sample in November and December had previously answered questions 
about the rebates in May and June.  We developed new questions for this subset of respondents to check 
the reliability of the survey responses.   Table 2a presents the cross-tabulation of the responses from 
individuals who were interviewed twice and in each interview provided a planned use for their rebate.  As 
a comparison of the bottom row and last column shows, there was little change in the aggregate pattern of 
responses for individuals interviewed in both November-December and May-June.  The total fraction who 
reported that they mostly increased their spending rose modestly, from 20 to 23 percent and there was a 
small shift toward debt repayment.  The relative stability of the aggregates estimates masks changes at the 
individual level.  For example, 35 percent of respondents (20 out of 58 in the first row) who expected to 
spend their rebate when first asked in the spring instead reported in the fall that they had mostly used their 
rebate to increase their savings or pay down their debt.  In contrast, only 13 percent of those (30 out of 
235 in the bottom two rows) who expected not to spend their rebate actually ended up spending it within 
the first year.  Altogether, about one-quarter of the re-interviews reported a different use for the rebate in 
the November-December surveys than in the May-June surveys.   
Individuals who changed their answer were then asked the following question: 
When we last talked to you in (May/June), you expected that the tax rebate would lead you to 
mostly (increase spending/increase saving/pay off debt). Why did you change your plans?    6
 
Table 2b summarizes the reasons for two groups of switchers: those who switched to spending the rebate 
(30 respondents) and those who switched to not spending the rebate (21 respondents).
8  Over 40 percent 
of respondents in both groups of switchers cited a change in personal circumstances or needs.  A change 
in economic conditions and the rebate being less than expected were cited as reasons somewhat more 
often by those who switched to saving than those who switched to spending.  A sizeable fraction of those 
who switched to spending did not provide a specific reason for their change in response.  Yet, in total, 
more than 70 percent of the 80 respondents who changed their response to the rebate articulated a reason, 
generally related to changes in personal circumstances or economic conditions for the difference.  We 
interpret the results from the re-interviews as suggesting that the survey questions are a fairly reliable 
measure of individuals’ plans for spending the rebate.   At an individual level, plans did change, usually 
for a good reason, but there was no systematic pattern to changes.  
2.1.2.  Timing of spending 
The impact of the rebate policy depends on the timing of the induced spending as well as its 
eventual total magnitude.  A sharp boost to spending occurring within a few quarters could have very 
different indirect effects than a slow steady rise in spending occurring over several years.  To better 
understand the timing of consumer responses, we asked those individuals who said that the tax rebates led 
them to mostly increase spending about the timing of this increase.   
The answers summarized in Table 3 suggest a rapid response to the tax rebates.  Over one-third of 
the individuals who reported mostly increasing spending said that their spending increased within a “few 
weeks” of receiving their rebate.
9  For another 50 percent of individuals, the spending response occurred 
between “one and three months” after receipt; less than one-sixth of the respondents said that the 
spending occurred “more than three months” after receipt.  Taken together, the survey implies the impetus 
to aggregate spending happened soon after households received the rebates, and that the induced spending 
faded rapidly over the subsequent months.
10   
The last two columns of Table 3 show the timing of spending for mostly-spend households with 
low income and with low assets—households that we might think ex ante would be credit-constrained or 
follow rule-of-thumb behavior.  We define “low-income” households as those in the bottom third of the 
                                                      
8 Excluded from Table 2b are the 29 individuals who switched between paying down debt and saving.   
9 The percentages in the top panel exclude the individuals who did not know the timing of their spending response.  
The estimate of the “within-a-few-weeks” spending response also includes two individuals who reported that they 
increased their spending prior to receiving the rebate. 
10 The results about timing are in marked contrast to the findings of Johnson et al. (2006) regarding the 2001 rebates, 
which suggest that per dollar of rebate there was a 33 cent increase in spending in the first quarter after receipt of the 
rebates, and another 33 cent increase in the second quarter.    7
income distribution for rebate recipients (those with annual household income below $40,000), and “low 
asset” households as those without any stock holdings (either directly or in mutual funds or retirement 
accounts).  Table 3 shows that households in each group are substantially more likely to increase their 
spending within a few weeks of receipt than other mostly-spend households.  Interestingly, while those 
two sub-groups spent their rebate more quickly, the fraction of respondents who said that the rebate led 
them to mostly increase spending over the year—shown in the second memo line—did not differ much 
from the sample as a whole.
11  Thus, the differential response of those who ex ante might be more credit-
constrained appears only in the speed of the spending response of those who were led to spend more. 
The results from the Reuters/Michigan survey on the timing of the spending response are broadly 
consistent with Broda and Parker’s (2008) preliminary estimates of the effect of the 2008 rebate using 
household expenditure data from AC Nielsen Homescan data supplemented by a survey about receipt of 
the rebate.  They find a noticeable boost to spending in the five weeks following the receipt of a rebate.  
This increase is concentrated among low-income and low-asset households, and fades away quickly.
12   
2.1.3.  Type of spending  
The survey also probed further about the type of rebate spending.   If an individual reported that 
the rebate mostly led them to increase their spending, then the survey followed up by asking, “Was the 
increase in spending mostly for regular purchases or mostly for something else that you would not have 
otherwise purchased?”  According to the survey, the type of spending was almost evenly split between 
regular and non-regular purchases.  The distinction between “regular” and other spending has been asked 
before in the Survey of Consumers, but it has some ambiguity about what is meant by “regular” and 
whether or not this spending should be interpreted as incremental.  Accordingly, our survey also included 
the following question for all individuals who spent the rebate: “Specifically, what was that spending?”  
The responses to this question are reported in Table 4.  The first column of Table 4, which provides the 
distribution of all rebate spending across the specific types, shows that one-quarter of the individuals who 
mostly spent their rebate used the rebate to purchase a major household item, such as a home appliance or 
furniture.  More than half of spenders cited some other specific expense, such as food or recreation.  
                                                      
11 In the case of the 2001and 2008 rebates, Shapiro and Slemrod (2003a, 2003b, 2009) document the lack of an 
association between income and the answer to the main question.  In the Coronado et al (2005) multivariate probit 
analysis of similar questions about the spending response to the 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act’s one-time payments associated with an increased child tax credit, higher-income households were more likely 
to mostly spend the one-time child tax credit payments.  
12 The Homescan survey carried out by Broda and Parker (2008) also asked a question similar to the main rebate 
question in the Reuters/Michigan survey.  Individuals who expected to “mostly spend” the rebate did, in fact, 
increase their actual spending after receiving their rebate by twice as much as those individuals who expected to 
“mostly save” or “mostly pay off debt” with the rebate.  We are grateful to Broda and Parker for sharing with us 
additional results from their preliminary data.   8
Another 17 percent reported that used the rebate for “general expenses.”  A small fraction (3 percent) of 
the self-reported “spenders” said that they used the rebate to pay off credit cards or other bills and taxes. 
Individuals in this last category might more plausibly be assigned to the “pay down debt” group.  The last 
two columns repeat the tabulation distinguishing between those who specified “regular expenses” and 
“something else” in the initial question about type of spending.  In general, the characterization of their 
spending provided by households is sensible.  For example spending on food and gasoline is a “regular 
expense” while vacation spending is “something else.” 
These results give some reassurances about the validity of the survey responses. Individuals had 
little problem identifying the type of spending, which suggests that the questions are salient for them.  
Moreover, there appears to be little misclassification in the responses on the basis of the follow-up 
question.  That is, few who responded mostly spend were using the rebate for debt repayment.  
Admittedly, there is remaining ambiguity about whether the spending was truly incremental, for example, 
whether spending on gasoline from the rebate would have taken place absent the rebate or, absent the 
rebate, whether the consumer would have cut back on some other spending to pay for gasoline.   
2.1.4.  Type of debt  
We knew from the February to June 2008 surveys that debt repayment was the modal use of the 
rebate.  Given this prevalence of debt repayment, we asked households in the November and December 
2008 surveys about the type of debt paid down.  Table 5 shows that about half of the respondents who 
said the rebate led them to mostly pay off debt said that their rebate mostly went to lowering their credit 
card balances, while another 9 percent used the rebate to pay down their mortgage debt.  About one-
quarter said that the debt repayment went to other specific bills or debts, such as medical bills, and the 
remaining 14 percent reported that they paid down every day bills or expenses.   
The last two columns of Table 5 show that there were substantial differences in the composition 
of the debts paid off with respect to household income and stock ownership.  Households with low 
income and those with low assets are more likely to pay off every day bills and less likely to pay off 
credit cards than the full sample.  These differences in the type of debt paid off likely reflect differences 
in the types of debt held by these subgroups and the fact that low income/assets households are more 
likely to be behind in paying bills.   
An interesting and important issue is whether people who report that the rebate led them to “mostly 
pay off everyday bills” should be thought of as “spending” the rebate.  The parsing of past, current, and 
future consumption—that is, the separation of debt and spending—is a challenge in interpreting the 
responses to the Reuters/Michigan survey as well as any other survey-based data that investigates rebate   9
spending effects.  If “pay off debt” or “pay bills” refers to paying medical bills or student loans that, in the 
absence of rebates, would have been deferred or financed with other sources of credit, then the rebates led 
people to pay off debt.  However, if these households would have otherwise cut back on their spending to 
pay those bills or pay off debt, then the rebates led to an increase in spending.   
 
2.1.5.  Is Saving and Debt Repayment Lagged Spending? 
  In the case of someone who reports that the rebate led them to initially add to their savings or pay 
off debt, but then later led them to increase their spending, the rebates induced greater spending with 
some lag.  Indeed, using credit card records at a large financial institution, Agarwal et al. (2008) find that 
payments to credit card accounts increased soon after receiving the 2001 rebate, but were subsequently 
offset by higher spending. To address this possibility, we followed Shapiro and Slemrod’s (2003b) 
approach and asked the mostly-save households whether they would use the additional savings to make a 
purchase later this year, or instead would try to keep up the higher savings for at least a year; we asked the 
analogous question for those who said they would mostly pay off debt.  In both cases the response was 
overwhelmingly that people who reported mostly not spending the tax rebate intended the resulting 
increase in assets (or decrease in debt) to last at least a year, with 85 percent of savers saying this and 90 
percent of debt reducers saying so.  These results are quite similar to what Shapiro and Slemrod (2003b) 
find for the 2001 rebate.   
  Hence, the survey evidence suggests that the increased saving and the debt reduction that the 
survey respondents report as a result of the 2008 rebate is quite persistent.  True, the survey responses 
admit the possibility that the increased saving or debt repayment might lead to spending after a year has 
passed.  Indeed, to the extent that the rebates represent incremental lifetime resources they will 
presumably be spent eventually.  Spending at horizons beyond a year, however, provide no current 
economic stimulus and is likely not the impact that proponents of the stimulus envisioned or hoped for.   
2.2  Cross-sectional Variation in Mostly Spending the Stimulus Payment 
In this section, we analyze how the consumer response to the rebate varies across households in the 
November-December surveys. 
2.2.1. Age 
Table 6 shows the distribution of mostly-spend rates by age.  Column (A) of the table gives the 
percent of respondents in each age group.  Columns (B), (C), (D), and (E) give the frequency of the 
responses.  Column (F) gives the mostly-spend rate (Column B as a fraction of the sum of columns B, C,   10
and D).  Column (G) gives the p-value for the test that the mostly-spend rates are equal across age groups.  
The following tables that examine other covariates have similar formats.  
Table 6 shows that the mostly-spend rate is significantly related to age.  Those under thirty have a 
mostly-spend rates of 11 percent while those sixty-five and over have mostly-spend rates of 26 percent.  
Except for the 50-64 age group, the mostly-spend rate is increasing in age.  The same age pattern of 
spending rates occurred for the 2001 tax rebates (Shapiro and Slemrod, 2003a and 2003b). 
  The age pattern is qualitatively consistent with the prediction of the life-cycle model that a one-
time increase in income is divided between current and future consumption.  The life-cycle model 
predicts spending rates that are higher for older households (who have a relatively low future-current 
ratio).  Even so, the spending rates are high relative to a life-cycle benchmark absent liquidity constraints 
or other factors that increase the propensity to consume from a one-time shock to income.  
  The age pattern of the mostly-spend rates is not consistent with the liquidity constraints.  Younger 
households are more likely to be liquidity constrained.  If liquidity constraints were important, we would 
expect a higher mostly-spend rate for them, other things equal. 
2.2.2. Income  and  wealth 
Table 7 reports tabulations of the mostly-spend rate for income and wealth.  The following pattern 
emerges.   
•  High-income and high-wealth groups have the highest mostly-spend rates.  
•  There is a modest U-shape in the spending distribution.  The lowest income group and the group 
with no stock ownership have slightly higher mostly-spend rates than higher-income groups and 
stock owners, but these differences are small and statistically insignificant. 
Consider the results in somewhat more detail.  Table 7 reports the distribution of spending by 
income group. Survey respondents are asked to give the level of income for the household.  If they 
decline, they are put into a bracketing sequence where they are asked whether their income falls within 
certain ranges.  We impute income based on these bracketed responses.  (Only a few respondents go into 
the bracketing sequence, i.e., if they are willing to disclose any income information, they give an exact 
response.)  As shown in the top panel of Table 7, those with income over $75,000—about the top third of 
the income distribution—have a mostly-spend rate of 26 percent.  This is about 7 percentage points higher 
than the average mostly-spend rate of the lower-income groups.  This difference is statistically significant 
(p-value of 0.038).  The pattern for lower-income groups have the U-shape mentioned above, but the   11
differences are not statistically significant.  Those who refused to disclose their income have particularly 
high mostly-spend rates.  The commonly-made claim that low-income households will spend more of a 
rebate is thus strongly contradicted by our findings.  
  The pattern for stock ownership is similar to that for income.  Stock ownership is the only 
measure of financial wealth available on the survey.  The question first asks whether or not the household 
owns stock, including in retirement accounts and mutual funds.  Those who report owning stock are asked 
to provide an exact amount.  Those who decline to give an exact amount are asked for a bracketed 
amount.  In the table, we impute values for the bracketed responses equal to the median of exact 
responses within the respective brackets.  More respondents give bracketed responses to the stock 
question than to the income question.   
The “no stocks” row in the second panel of Table 7 provides the responses of those who said 
explicitly they own no stock.  The “owns stock” gives the responses of those who said explicitly that they 
owned stock.  This line is followed by the responses by level of stock ownership of those who said they 
owned stock (either exact or imputed from brackets).  The second to last row provides information about 
those who refused to give a bracketed amount. The last line gives the responses of those who refused or 
did not know whether they owned stock.  
The two-thirds of the population that owns stock has a slightly higher mostly-spend rate than the 
one-third of the population that does not.  There is also an interesting pattern within the stockholders.  The 
highest-stock-ownership individuals have relatively high mostly-spend rates—25 percent for those with 
stock valued between $100,000 and $250,000 and almost 40 percent for those with stock is excess of 
$250,000.  The lowest spending rate is for those with a moderate amount of stock—between $50,000 and 
$100,000.  The mostly-spend rates for the high-wealth households tell a similar story as that told by 
income.  The best-off households are most likely to spend the stimulus payment.  As with income, the 
results based on stock market wealth do not support the contention that less-well-off households are more 
likely to spend a rebate.  One story that is consistent with these findings is that moderate-stock-wealth 
households have an inclination to save but, unlike the high-wealth households, have not accomplished 
their saving goals.  That is, high-wealth households might be high-saving types, but have already met 
their asset targets.   
2.2.3.  How the payment was received 
The stimulus payments were paid by direct deposit if the Internal Revenue Service had bank 
account information from an income tax return filed previously and were disbursed by check otherwise.    12
Table 8 shows the distribution of responses to the rebate by the form of disbursement, and reveals that the 
form of disbursement has no correlation with the spending rate from the payment.  Given that those with 
electronic-funds-transfer information are likely to be different from those without it (i.e., more likely to 
have a bank account, be more financial sophisticated) one might have expected differences in behavior.  
2.2.4.  Changing financial conditions and income expectations 
Table 9 reports the survey responses by how the household’s financial condition compares with 
the previous year (first panel), by what the respondent expects for financial conditions next year (second 
panel), and by income expectations (third panel).  There are no strong patterns in these results.   Indeed, 
the patterns in the second and third panels appear to be contradictory—worse expected financial 
conditions is associated with more spending, but worse expected income is associated with less spending.  
Note, however, that these differences are not statistically significant.   We will further explore the 
relationship between expected income and spending in the multivariate analysis that follows.   
2.2.5.  Multivariate analysis:  Age, Income, and Wealth   
A number of the covariates we have just discussed are correlated, perhaps in complicated ways.  
Indeed, the preceding univariate analysis might be misleading because of the correlation among the 
covariates. To untangle the relationships between the covariates and the response to the rebate, we next 
present a multivariate analysis of the factors just discussed plus some others.     
  Table 10 reports the results of estimating a linear probability model where the dependent variable 
is equal to 100 if the respondent reports that the rebate led mostly to spending the rebate and zero if the 
respondent reports that it led mostly to saving or mostly to paying off debt.  Column (A) reports the 
regression on dummies for age, income and wealth categories, and survey-month dummies for the 
November and December surveys. It also includes some simple demographic variables—a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the respondent is married or partnered, and a variable equal to the number of 
children in the household.  The remaining columns report results pooled across all the surveys (February 
though June, November, and December).  Recall that, because the wording of the survey has slight 
differences across months, these results capture survey design effects as well as time effects.  We pool the 
results to gain precision, especially for categories of the covariates that are relatively infrequent.  The 
estimates use the sampling weights, and the standard errors are corrected for the heteroskedasticity arising 
from the weighting.  The monthly dummies in column (B), though they bounce up and down, are not 
significantly different from zero (the p-value for the hypothesis that they are jointly zero is 0.53). 
The multivariate results are broadly consistent with the univariate tabulations.   13
•  The youngest respondents (the excluded group in the regressions) have the lowest mostly-spend 
rate.  The oldest group has the highest. 
•  The highest income group has the highest mostly-spend rate. 
•  The highest wealth group has the highest mostly-spend rate.  There is a dip down in spending 
rates for the moderate wealth group. 
These findings are, however, fairly imprecise and less clear than the univariate tabulations.  Given the 
substantial positive correlation of income and wealth, it is hard to statistically identify separate effects of 
these two factors.  Nonetheless, the results in Table 10 are strongly at odds with the conventional wisdom 
that the young and the less well off are more likely to spend a rebate.  That hypothesis can be strongly 
rejected in our data.   
  The presumption that the young and the poor are more likely to spend a rebate shaped the debate 
over the 2008 stimulus payments. The Congressional Budget Office (2008, p. 7) in its analysis of the 
options for stimulus in early 2008, states, “Lower-income households are more likely to be credit 
constrained and more likely to be among those with the highest propensity to spend. Therefore, policies 
aimed at lower-income households tend to have greater stimulative effects.”  A Hamilton Project paper on 
stimulus options (Elmendorf and Furman, 2008, p. 20) reaches the same conclusion.  Our findings do not 
support these presumptions.  Nonetheless, concerns about equity might argue for directing ad hoc 
government payments to low-income individuals.  And the rebates did afford the opportunity for low-
income individuals to reduce debt or to save, which surely increases their well-being.   Yet, they did not 
provide as large a boost to current aggregate demand as that from the rebates paid to higher-income 
households. 
2.2.6.  Multivariate Analysis: Form of Payment  
We also consider whether the multivariate results for the form of payment differ from what is 
suggested by the univariate tabulations, where the form of payment had no association with the spending 
response to the rebate.  In the univariate setting, there could be conflicting confounds for receiving the 
rebate by EFT, for example, the old, even though they have relatively high wealth, might be reluctant to 
have EFT.  A multivariate analysis (not tabulated) of whether the payment was received by EFT leads to 
the same conclusion as the univariate one (coefficient of dummy variable for EFT is -0.2 with a standard 
error of 2.6).  Thus, the form of payment has no predictive power for the effect of the rebate. 
2.2.7.  Multivariate Analysis:  Expected Income Growth    14
We now turn to a multivariate analysis of the relationship between spending the rebate and 
households’ income and expected income. The permanent income model implies that there should be a 
low spending rate from a temporary tax rebate.  In the presence of liquidity constraints, spending might be 
higher from a temporary rebate depending on the relationship of current to future income.  In particular, if 
individuals are liquidity constrained and their income is expected to be higher in the future, the spending 
rate from transitory income should be high as the household uses the temporary income to smooth 
consumption.   
We are able to examine this possibility using the expected income growth questions that are 
asked each month in the Survey of Consumers.  Prior to answering our questions about the rebates, 
respondents are asked whether they expect their income next year to be higher, lower, or the same as next 
year.  Those who expect income to change are asked by what percent they expect it to change.  Responses 
to these questions are incorporated into the multiple regression analysis reported in columns (C) and (D) 
of Table 10.  The third column includes dummies that are equal to one for those who expect income to 
increase (g>0) and one for those who expect it to decrease (g<0).  Income expected to remain unchanged 
is the omitted category.  Controlling for income, stock holding, and demographics, expected income 
growth is positively associated with mostly spending the rebate.  The difference in the mostly-spend rate 
between those expecting income to increase and income to decrease is 5.6 percentage points (the p-value 
for the test that the coefficients are jointly zero is 0.02 and is 0.003 for the test that their difference is 
zero).   
Column (D) uses the quantitative expectations about expected change in income.  In the survey, 
those who said income would rise or fall are asked for the percent change (coded as an integer).  We 
define dummies for those expecting income to rise 4 percent or more, to rise between 1 and 3 percent, to 
fall between 1 and 9 percent, and to fall by 10 percent or more.  The dummies are defined to equally 
divide those expecting falling and rising income, respectively.  Again, those whose income is expected to 
remain the same are the excluded category.  The results strengthen the findings shown in column (C).  
There is a strong, monotonic relationship between expected income growth and spending the rebate, as 
predicted by the permanent income model.  There is a difference of 9 percentage points in the mostly-
spend rate between those expecting especially large (>4 percent) income growth and those expecting 
especially large (>10 percent) income declines. These differences are strongly statistically significant. 
These results showing a strong relationship between expected income growth and rebate spending 
are consistent with the view that liquidity constraints are important for determining spending of the 
rebate.  Controlling for the level of assets (stock market wealth) and income, those with expected income   15
growth are substantially more likely to spend the rebate than those with expected income declines.  
Moreover, in our sample, low-income individuals do not have particularly high expected income growth, 
so the level of income is not a valid proxy for detecting liquidity-constrained behavior.    
2.3  Translation of Survey Response to Aggregate Spending  
In this section, we translate the survey results to an estimate of the aggregate spending in each month 
following the distribution of the rebates.  This calculation requires us to estimate both a cumulative MPC 
out of the rebates and the timing of spending.  To calculate the MPC out of the rebates after one year, we 
start with Shapiro and Slemrod’s (2003b) method for translating the fraction saying they will mostly 
spend the rebate into an MPC.  The method recognizes that those saying they will mostly spend may save 
part of the rebate and those saying they will mostly save or pay debt may spend part of the rebate.  
Shapiro and Slemrod (2003b) proposed a simple, piece-wise linear probability distribution function of the 
MPC for rebate recipients and calibrate it based on three assumptions.  1) An individual reports “mostly 
spend” if her MPC is 0.5 or higher; 2) the modal MPC is set equal to the average mostly-spend rate; 3) 
the probability distribution function is piece-wise linear, such that it has a constant slope from a 0 MPC to 
the modal MPC and a constant (potentially different) slope from the mode to a maximum MPC.  The 
distribution function for the individual MPCs that is implied by these assumptions has only four 
parameters (only one of which is a free parameter given the assumptions about the shape of the 
distribution).  The calibration of one of those parameters, determines the values of the other three 
parameters as well as the average MPC.  By varying the free parameter, this procedure implies that the 
aggregate MPC corresponding to a 22 percent spend rate lies between 0.30 and 0.35.  While 
acknowledging that this is just one of many possible reasonable methodologies for constructing an 
estimate of the MPC from the survey responses, we use an MPC of one-third as our baseline in this 
analysis.  We will also present the implications of alternative assumptions about the distribution and 
timing of spending. 
In the survey, individuals who report mostly spending their rebate are given three options for 
reporting the timing of that spending: within a few weeks of receipt (36 percent), one to three months 
later (50 percent), and more than three months later (14 percent).  The percent of spending distributed 
across these three time periods was previously discussed in Table 3.  To construct our measure of 
aggregate rebate spending, we use the monthly timing of the rebate disbursements (as shown in Figure 1).  
We also need monthly timing for spending at a finer level of detail than provided by the survey responses.  
The first column of Table 11 shows our translation of the survey responses to the percent of rebate 
spending in each month after a respondent receives a rebate. (Note this column sums to 100 percent.)  The 
next three columns show how we distribute the categorical survey responses across these seven months.    16
For example, we assume that all of the individuals (in the second column) who claimed to spend their 
rebates “within a few weeks” (36 percent of all spenders) did their spending within a month of receiving 
their rebate.   For those (in the third column) who said that their spending occurred “within one to three 
months” of receiving the rebate, we assume that some of the spending occurred within the month of 
receipt, but most was concentrated in the second month after receipt.  Similarly, we assume that the 
spending of the last category “more than three months later” was concentrated in the early months of that 
category.  While other interpretations are possible, our presumed monthly pattern of spending respects the 
basic pattern from the survey responses. Notice also that the sums of the second through fourth column in 
the “Total” line match the survey responses in Table 3.  In the final column of Table 11, which sums to 
one-third, we multiply our monthly timing pattern for all rebate spending (in column 1) by our estimate of 
the aggregate MPC to get the fraction of the rebate spent in each month after receipt.   
Here is a summary of our approach to translating the survey responses into aggregate estimates:  
First, we use a distributional assumption to translate mostly-spend rates into an MPC.  Second, we 
translate the survey responses about timing of spending (middle three columns of Table 11) into a 
presumed monthly pattern of spending (first column of Table 11).  Third, we multiply the monthly pattern 
of timing of spending by the survey-based estimate of the MPC to get spending propensities distributed 
by month from receipt of the rebate (last column of Table 11).  Fourth, we use the aggregate data on the 
timing of disbursements from Figure 1 and the monthly spending propensities from the last column of 
Table 11 to derive monthly aggregate spending from the rebate.   
Our estimate of the addition to aggregate spending due to the rebates in each quarter last year is 
reported in Table 12.  The first and third columns of Table 12 translate the monthly increases in income in 
Figure 1 to quarterly values.  They underscore how the rebates caused a sharp, but temporary, boost to 
disposable personal income (DPI).  In 2008:Q2 the rebates of $312 billion (at an annual rate) boosted the 
growth in real DPI by 12 percentage points at an annual rate.
13  And while the disbursement of the rebates 
continued in the third and fourth quarters, the amounts were substantially less than in the second quarter, 
so the rebates were then a drag on the growth of real DPI.  According to the survey, the household 
spending response built up somewhat more slowly than the increase in income.  The main boost to the 
growth of real PCE (in the fourth column) also occurred in the second quarter when the income boost was 
the largest. The largest reversal of this temporary spending effect occurred in the fourth quarter—one 
quarter later than the reversal in income.  Again, since the rebates provide a one-time increase in income, 
any boost to PCE growth rates must be reversed as spending falls back to its normal level.  These survey-
based estimates suggest that, given the large magnitude of the rebates, a cumulative MPC of one-third 
                                                      
13 We deflated the rebates, as well as total DPI, by the PCE deflator to obtain a constant dollar, real estimate.     17
provided a substantial boost to the change in aggregate spending in the second quarter and a substantial 
drag to the change in spending in the fourth quarter.     
While we view this estimate of the aggregate rebate spending responses as a reasonable 
representation of the survey responses, it is not the only possible estimate.  To further explore this issue, 
we constructed nine alternate translations of the survey responses to aggregate rebate spending.  One set 
of scenarios is based on a smaller cumulative MPC of 0.25, based on assuming that individuals who 
report “mostly spending” have an MPC of 0.8 and those who report “mostly save/pay debt” have an MPC 
of 0.1.  (The MPC of 0.1 is roughly a straight-line amortizing of the rebate income over 10 years.)  A 
lower MPC is also consistent with a story that the claimed spending of some of the mostly-spend 
respondents who said the rebate led them to increase “regular expenses” might actually represent a 
change in the timing of spending, but not a true increment to spending.  In another set of scenarios, we 
use a higher aggregate MPC of 0.40 based on the follow-up probe to whether the individual will maintain 
the higher savings and lower debt levels for a year.  The inclusion of individuals who will later spend the 
rebate increases the proportion of “mostly spend” to 29 percent and is consistent with an MPC of 0.40 
using the Shapiro and Slemrod’s (2003b) method of conversion.  Another reason for a higher MPC is the 
respondents who said that they paid off regular bills and expenses with their rebate, since they might have 
cut back on this spending in the absence of the rebates.  In the remaining scenarios the MPC is set to the 
baseline MPC estimate of 0.33, but we vary the timing of spending to create a faster and slower monthly 
spending,  The various estimates for rebate spending under these alternative assumptions about the 
aggregate MPC and the monthly timing pattern are shown in Table 13.  The high and low values for the 
contribution of rebates to the change in real spending in each quarter are depicted as the whiskers on the 
bars in Figure 2.  These alternate estimates create an interval of about one-half percentage point (at an 
annual rate), on average, around the baseline estimate of the aggregate MPC and do not substantially alter 
the implied timing of aggregate spending of the rebate. 
3.  Comparisons with Aggregate Data  
In this section, we compare our survey-based estimates of the rebate program’s effect on aggregate 
consumer spending and household debt levels with data from the National Income and Product Accounts 
(NIPA) published by the Bureau of Economic Activity (BEA) and data on consumer credit published by 
the Federal Reserve Board.    In general, we conclude that our survey-based estimates of the aggregate 
MPC are consistent with how these aggregates fluctuated in 2008.   We recognize, though, that the 
appropriate counterfactual against which to measure the rebate’s effect cannot be known with certainty.  
In response, we present various methods, including simple tabulations and model simulations, and various 
data sources to assess the aggregate impact.   18
  This analysis is limited to the direct effects of the rebate on aggregate spending and debt 
repayment.  We make no attempt to account for the general equilibrium or multiplier effects.  Similarly, 
we make no attempt to account for possible policy responses to the rebate, for example, whether or not 
the Federal Open Market Committee would have chosen a different path for its policy rate had there not 
been a rebate. 
 
3.1  Aggregate Spending Data 
In the last section, we used the survey results to estimate the boost to consumer spending in the year 
following the rebates.  We now compare our estimates of rebate-induced incremental spending to the 
aggregate data from the NIPA using tabulations and to simulations of a standard forecasting model of 
consumer spending.   
 
3.1.1.   Personal Saving Rate 
The personal saving rate, which is often used to summarize household spending behavior, 
fluctuated sharply over the course of 2008.  As the thick line in Figure 3 shows, the personal saving rate 
began near 1 percent at the start of 2008 and jumped sharply to just below 6 percent in May when half of 
the rebate income was disbursed.  When the rebate payments subsided, the saving rate fell back below 2 
percent in August.  When the financial turmoil intensified in the fall and consumer spending contracted 
sharply, the saving rate moved up again and ended 2008 at near 5 percent.   
The saving rate has been used in both the popular press and academic discussions to assess the 
impact rebates.  Similar to these analyses, the thin light line in Figure 3, which excludes the rebate income 
(from Figure 1) from the denominator of the saving rate, illustrates that the large changes in rebate 
income which have an immediate effect on the denominator of the saving rate can fully account for the 
sharp rise in the saving rate in the spring of 2008.  Note that the vertical difference between the thick and 
thin solid lines is exactly equal to the rebate payments as a percent of disposable income.  As Shapiro and 
Slemrod (2009) point out, this graph shows that over this period the rebate as a percent of disposable 
personal income closely tracks the personal saving rate.  Note, however, that the thin line still reflects the 
aggregate spending numbers from the NIPAs, so that alternate saving rate in the thin line still includes 
any effects of the rebates on spending.  The dashed line in Figure 3 removes both our survey-based 
estimate of rebate spending (from Section 2.3) and the rebate income from the saving rate.  If there were 
no other shocks hitting the economy in the spring of 2008 and if the rebates had no general equilibrium 
effects, this dashed line represents the personal saving rate in the counterfactual world with no rebates.  
Here we see that, in the absence of the rebates, the saving rate would have risen slowly and fairly 
smoothly from 1/2 percent in April to 2 percent in August.  As shown by the difference between the   19
dashed line and the thin line, our survey-based estimates suggests that the rebate-induced spending held 
the saving rate down by roughly 3/4 percentage point, on average, in May through August.  While this is 
only a fraction of the 4 percentage point increase in the saving rate over 2008, it does suggest that the 
rebates had a noticeable impact on household spending, at least temporarily.   As noted, though, an 
assumption underlying this simple analysis is that households did not face any other shocks during the 
spring of 2008.  In fact the distribution of the rebates coincided with a rising unemployment rate, falling 
consumer sentiment, declining household net worth, falling house prices, and rising oil prices.  All of 
these factors would be likely relevant in determining a reasonable counterfactual saving rate and are not 
reflected in this analysis.  We turn next to simulations of a forecasting model to assess the plausibility of 
our estimated rebate spending effects.  
 
3.1.2.   Model-Based Comparisons 
There were many factors driving spending and saving decisions in 2008 other than the tax rebate.  
In this section we use a simple model of aggregate spending to isolate innovations in consumption growth 
and to compare them with the survey-based estimate of changes in spending owing to the rebate. We 
project the quarterly change in real PCE using a standard model (as in Davis and Palumbo, 2001) of 
aggregate spending that excludes rebate income and determine how “surprised” this model is by the 
actual spending.
14   Note that this analysis is partial equilibrium.  It makes no attempt to account for any 
endogenous responses (multiplier effects) of the rebate.  
Table 14 compares the actual change in personal consumption expenditure to the econometric 
simulation and our survey-based estimate.  The quarterly changes in real consumer spending in 2008 (the 
top line in Table 14) as published by the BEA are broadly consistent with a fast, albeit temporary, 
increase in spending after households received their tax rebates.  The model simulation under the 
counterfactual of no rebates is shown in the second line of Table 14.  This projection incorporates some of 
the other factors referred to earlier that likely affected spending in 2008, such as consumer sentiment, the 
unemployment rate, and the declines in disposable income (excluding rebates).
15  However, this model 
does not have any direct measures of financial market turmoil or the tightening of credit standards or 
controls for energy prices (apart through their effect on real disposable income through the PCE deflator).  
                                                      
14For this exercise, we estimate a dynamic, error-correction model of aggregate spending using published data 
through 2007:Q4. The model is simulated starting in 2008:Q1 with the model's prediction of the lagged change in 
real PCE and the estimated gap from target spending, as well as the actual real disposable personal income 
excluding the tax rebates, household net worth, the real Federal funds rate, the change in the unemployment rate, 
and consumer sentiment.  Target spending is a function of income, transfers, and wealth.  
15 It is possible that the tax rebates had some direct effects on these other contemporaneous variables, but the tax 
rebates are unlikely to be the primary reason for their movements.     20
The results of the model simulation that excludes the rebate income suggest that the actual change 
in real spending in the second quarter was surprisingly strong (the model error was 2.2 percentage points, 
as shown in the third line of Table 14) and then was surprisingly weak in the third and fourth quarters (the 
model errors were -4.0 percentage points and -0.7 ppt. respectively).  Line 4 of Table 14 shows the 
survey-based estimates of aggregate spending from the rebate taken from Table 12.  As a comparison of 
the third and fourth lines in Table 14 shows, the survey-based contribution of the rebates to the change in 
real PCE can account for a sizeable portion of the model residual in the second and fourth quarters.  Thus 
the survey responses on rebates are helpful in understanding part of the quarterly pattern of spending last 
year.  Unsurprisingly, a large negative residual remains in the second half of 2008 even after accounting 
for the rebates owing to the collapse in spending related to the financial crisis.  All in all, it appears that a 
rapid, temporary boost to spending from the rebates was an important factor in the quarterly pattern of 
aggregate spending last year.  
Hence, although the survey evidence indicates that only about a third of the rebate was spent, the 
rebate was large enough relative to income, and its effect on spending concentrated enough in time, that it 
had a noticeable effect on the timing of spending in 2008.  The growth in household spending was 
stronger in the second quarter and weaker in the third and fourth quarter than it would have been absent 
the rebate.  Absent the rebate, a weakening of spending earlier in 2008—prior to the September financial 
crisis and collapse of the stock market—would have been more apparent.  This line of reasoning suggests 
that the weakening of spending (perhaps from high oil prices and poor employment prospects) was a 
factor driving the weakness of the economy prior to the financial collapse in the fall, and that the financial 
crisis was likely not the only factor leading to a decline in spending (increase in saving) in the second half 
of 2008. 
3.2  Aggregate Debt Data 
Because a large fraction of households reported that the rebate led them to pay down debt, we also 
examine aggregate data on consumer debt for a rebate effect.  Table 15 translates the survey responses 
into the aggregate addition to savings and repayment of debt due to the rebates.  The survey question 
prompts individuals for the effect of the rebates on their “financial situation this year,” so these estimates 
should not necessarily be viewed as the “long-run” response to the rebates.  Nonetheless, the behavioral 
response within the first year is arguably the most important for fiscal stimulus.  Recall that the survey 
responses suggest that the $96 billion of rebate income led to an additional $32 billion of spending within 
a year of receipt.  Of the remaining amount, the relative percentages of “save” and “pay down debt” in the 
third column (“Nov-Dec” responses) of Table 1 suggest that 70 percent of the $64 billion that was not 
spent (a total of $45 billion) went to debt reduction.  According to respondents (as reported in Table 5),   21
half of the debt paid off with the rebates was credit card debt, which implies $23 billion less credit card 
debt.  As we have already discussed, one open question with the debt responses is how to interpret the 
sizeable minority of households that said they used the rebates to pay specific everyday “bills.”  Here we 
treat those as (non-credit card) debt repayment, but recognize that they might be indicate increased 
spending.   
It is then useful to compare our survey estimates of debt repayment due to the rebates to 
aggregate data on consumer credit and assess whether the counterfactual implied by the survey-based 
estimates is plausible.  Figure 4 depicts the ratio of revolving consumer credit (mainly credit cards) to 
spending in the current and several prior recessions.
16   We use the ratio of debt-to-spending to remove the 
differences in the patterns of spending across the recessions, such as the sharp drop in spending in the 
2008 recession versus the modest gains in the 2001 recession, because these differences in spending tend 
to directly affect the accumulation of debt.
17  Moreover, since borrowing tends to rise in recessions, we 
have normalized the ratio to one at the NBER-dated cyclical peak of each recession.  We show the ratio in 
the two years prior to the peak and the two years after the peak.  The thick solid line shows the movement 
in consumer credit in the current recession, where the cyclical peak is in 2007:Q4.  The thick dashed line 
is the counterfactual experience of no rebates constructed from our survey-based estimates of rebate-
induced debt repayment and spending.
18  In the absence of the rebates, we would have expected the 
revolving debt to rise more rapidly relative to spending than it actually did. By the second quarter of 
2008, the counterfactual ratio is over 5 percent higher than its level in 2007:Q4, whereas, the published 
data show an increase of only 1 percent.
19  For comparison, the other lines in the figure show the ratio of 
revolving credit to spending in the 2001, 1990, and 1974 recessions.  The most recent recession in 2001—
during which households also received tax rebates—shows little change in the ratio of revolving debt to 
spending.  However, in the 1990 recession and the 1974 recession (another recession with a temporary 
reduction in taxes), the ratio rose more than 5 percent above their cyclical peaks.  Thus, according to our 
                                                      
16 Revolving consumer credit is the nominal, seasonally adjusted monthly aggregate in the Federal Reserve Board’s 
G.19 Consumer Credit release.  Spending is the BEA’s nominal, seasonally adjusted PCE.  The 1980 recession is 
excluded because a change in the regulation led to sharp movement in consumer credit, and the 1981 recession is 
excluded because of  its pre-recession period overlap with the 1980 recession.  The revolving credit series is not 
available in the G.19 for the recessions before 1974.  
17 Nonetheless, the qualitative points of this analysis are the same if we use the level of revolving debt, instead of the 
ratio of revolving debt to spending. 
18 To construct the counterfactual ratio, we subtract rebate spending from the denominator and add debt paid down 
with the rebates back to the numerator.  We assume that debt repayment is phased in as $11 billion less revolving 
debt in 2008:Q2 and $23 billion less revolving debt in 2008:Q3 (and later quarters). 
19 Even though our calculations assume that the reduction in debt persists, the gap between the actual and 
counterfactual ratio diminishes over time, since the impact of the rebates on spending (the denominator of the ratio) 
are temporary.   22
estimates, the rebates in 2008 markedly slowed the growth in revolving credit relative to spending in this 
recession.  The counterfactual is well within the range of past recessions.   
  
 4.  Comparisons to Other Surveys  
Survey responses can be sensitive to the precise wording of questions, the ordering of questions, and 
other aspects of the survey instrument in ways that can be misleading about the respondents’ actual or 
intended behaviors.  A natural response to this potential problem is to field the surveys with a wide 
variety of reasonable wording, question order, etc., and analyze the differences in the responses. Such 
research would require a sample and budget larger than ours.   
A second-best approach is to compare across the pattern of answers provided in response to other 
surveys that address the same question but that do so in slightly different ways.  This is a second-best 
approach because it is impossible to control for all aspects of the survey other than the desired treatment 
(e.g., question wording, and order); generally the timing of the survey, survey mode, sampling technique, 
and other features also differ.  Nevertheless, such comparisons can be insightful. 
We identified twenty-two surveys that addressed the question of the consumer response to the 2008 
tax rebates, many undertaken by the most prominent polling organizations.  In Table 16 we summarize 
the findings of twelve of those surveys, the twelve done by nationally known polling organizations.
20  The 
figures listed there generally differ from the headline numbers provided by the polling organization, as we 
have re-calculated them to be a percentage of those who received a rebate and provided an answer, and 
made some other imputations.  Several of these surveys featured a three-part answer set similar to ours.  
Sometimes the term “save or invest” was used instead of “save” sometimes the term “pay bills” was used 
instead of “pay down debt,” etc.   
In the four polls using a three-part answer scheme and wording very close to ours (#2, #5, #6, and 
#10), the response distributions were very similar to what we found.  The spend rate varied from 19 
percent to 23 percent, the save rate varied from 24 percent to 38 percent, and the pay down debt rate 
varied from 35 percent to 53 percent. 
One notable variation in the question wording was the substitution of “pay bills” for “pay off debt” 
or “pay down debt.”  When “pay bills” was the third option of a three-part question, (in poll #5 and #10), 
                                                      
20 The findings of the other ten polls were not qualitatively different from the twelve we highlight, but on average 
were less likely to use nationally representative samples and provide detailed information about their methodology.     23
the percentage that gave this answer was somewhat higher—49 percent and 53 percent in these two 
surveys.   
One clear outlier to this central tendency of results is a poll done on January 30-31 by Fox 
News/Opinion Dynamics.  This poll offered the respondents just two basic choices for what they “would 
do with the money”: “save it [a tax rebate] or spend it,” with an option of “spend some, save some.”  In 
response to this question, only 37 percent said they would save it, 53 percent said they would spend it, 
and 10 percent said they would spend some and save some.  If this stark difference in the response 
distribution is due just to the two-part rather than three-part question structure, this is a troubling sign of 
non-robustness to the survey design, although the correct interpretation is not completely clear.  But we 
believe that the main source for the outlying result is that the absence of a response option of “pay off 
bills” or “pay off debt” prompted people to label it as spending when the rebate check was used, for 
example, to pay off bills that had piled up on the dining room table.  This should more properly be 
categorized as not affecting the flow of expenditure. 
Some polls allowed multiple responses to the question of what they would do with the rebate check.  
Consider the ABC News/Washington Post poll done on January 30-February 1 (#3).  If we categorize the 
multiple answers into our standard three categories, we find that 24 percent said they would most likely 
spend the federal rebate, 36 percent said they would save or invest (with more than three-quarters using 
the save terminology), and 35 percent said they would “pay bills” or “pay off debt”; of the latter category, 
more than five times as many people volunteered the term “pay off bills” compared to “pay off debt.”  A 
similar pattern of answers was found in a follow-up poll done in April (#9).  A Zogby International poll 
for TransUnion TrueCredit.com (#4)) found that 45 percent would pay down debt and 29 percent would 
save (or invest).  The 24 percent listed in the “spend’ category is the sum of those who answered they 
would buy something necessary and those who would “splurge;” of the 24 percent in the spend category, 
18 percent would buy something necessary, and 6 percent would “splurge.”  This semantic distinction 
may be important, if “necessary” implies spending that would occur anyway, but for which the rebate 
might have (just) changed the timing of the expenditure or the timing of the payment for the expenditure.  
Poll #11, also conducted by Zogby, found a relatively high 34 percent spend rate.  As in the other Zogby 
poll, the 34 percent figure is the sum of those who responded they would spend the rebate on everyday 
expenses and those who would splurge; of the 34 percent, 26 percent would purchase everyday items, and 
8 percent would splurge on something they wouldn’t normally buy.  
We conclude from this exercise that small changes in question wording and possibly major 
differences in survey design such as question ordering and context do not have a major effect on the   24
distribution of responses.  However, the absence of a “pay bills” or “pay off debt” response option may 
induce many people to report spending the rebate when they in fact paid off debt. Moreover, when asked 
to characterize a “spend” response between everyday expenses (such as gas, food, and utilities) or 
“splurge” expenses that they otherwise wouldn’t buy, more than three-quarters of people choose the 
former, suggesting that some of what is characterized as spending in the headline survey results 
(including our own)  may instead be alterations in short-term debt.  
 
5.  Conclusions and Implications 
How households respond to the tax rebates is central for evaluating the aggregate stimulus that the 
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 provided.  One way to learn about how households responded is to ask 
them.  When we do so, we learn that only about one-fifth say that the rebates led them to mostly increase 
spending, while over half said it would lead them to mostly pay off debt.  Of those in the mostly-spend 
category, the spending response was swift, with a third reporting most of the spending occurred within a 
few weeks of receiving the rebate and another half increasing their spending within one to three months 
of receiving the rebate.  Older respondents were generally more likely to spend the rebates.  Low-income 
and low-wealth households do not report spending more as a result of the rebate, although those who do 
report mostly spending the rebate in this group do so more quickly than other spenders.  A review of other 
surveys confirms the general pattern of results, and suggests that small changes in survey design do not 
have a major effect on the distribution of responses, although the absence of a “pay bills” or “pay off 
debt” response option induces many people to report spending the rebate when their behavior is better 
characterized as altering the timing of a largely unchanged spending pattern. 
The survey responses imply that about one-third of the rebate was spent.  This MPC, combined 
with our evidence about the timing of this spending, seems quite consistent with aggregate data on 
movements in saving, spending and debt in 2008.  Of course, definitive interpretation of the aggregate 
data requires knowing how the aggregates would have behaved under the counterfactual of no rebate.  
Providing evidence on this counterfactual is a principal motivation for our survey analysis. Overall, the 
results suggest that the rebate program provided only a modest stimulus per dollar of rebate.   
Nonetheless, the rebates were so large and so quickly disbursed and the fraction spent was spent 
so rapidly that they had a non-trivial effect on aggregate spending in the second and third quarters of 
2008.  Although the rebates clearly did not stave off the sharp drop in economic activity in 2008, they did 
affect the timing of its onset by making growth in household spending noticeably stronger in the second 
quarter and noticeably weaker in the fourth quarter than it would have been absent the rebate.  Taking into   25
account the effect of the rebate in delaying the collapse of household spending in 2008 will be important 
for understanding the causes of the sharp decline in output in the second half of the year.  Absent the 
rebate, the sharp decline in spending that is evident in aggregate data beginning in the third quarter of 
2008 would have started in the second quarter, prior to the financial crisis of the fall.      26
Appendix:  Survey Questions 
This appendix gives the wording of the main question about spending or saving the rebate from the 2008 
Reuters/University of Michigan Survey of Consumers.  The wording of the question varies depending on 
whether the survey was in the field before, during, or after the disbursement of the rebate.  The text of the 
complete tax rebate module is available at http://www.umich.edu/~shapiro/. 
February, March, and April 2008 
This year (it is likely that)
21 tax rebates will be mailed to most individuals. In most cases, the tax rebate 
will be six hundred dollars for individuals and twelve hundred dollars for married couples. Those with 
dependent children will receive an additional three hundred dollars per child. Individuals earning more 
than seventy-five thousand dollars and married couples earning more than one hundred fifty thousand 
dollars will get smaller tax rebates or no tax rebate at all.  
 
Thinking about your (family’s) financial situation this year, will the tax rebate lead you mostly to increase 
spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt? 
 
May and June 2008 
Under this year’s economic stimulus program tax rebates will be mailed or directly deposited into a 
taxpayer’s bank account. In most cases, the tax rebate will be six hundred dollars for individuals and 
twelve hundred dollars for married couples. Those with dependent children will receive an additional 
three hundred dollars per child. Individuals earning more than seventy-five thousand dollars and married 
couples earning more than one hundred fifty thousand dollars will get smaller tax rebates or no rebate at 
all. 
 
Thinking about your (family’s) financial situation this year, will the tax rebate lead you mostly to increase 
spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt? 
 
 
November and December 2008 
Under the economic stimulus program, tax rebates were sent to most individuals earlier this year. In most 
cases, the tax rebate was six hundred dollars for individuals and twelve hundred dollars for married 
couples. Those with dependent children received an additional three hundred dollars per child. Individuals 
earning more than seventy-five thousand dollars and married couples earning more than one hundred fifty 
thousand dollars got smaller tax rebates or no rebate at all.  
 
Did you (or your family) receive a tax rebate? 
 
[For those who received the rebate,] 
Thinking about your (family’s) financial situation this year, did the tax rebate lead you mostly to increase 
spending, mostly to increase saving, or mostly to pay off debt? 
 
                                                      
21 The expression in parentheses was included in the survey prior to the enactment of the stimulus.   27
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Note:  Data are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Treasury.   Levels are at 
monthly rate in current dollars and are not seasonally adjusted   29
Figure 2: Contribution of Rebates to Change in Real Personal Consumption Expenditures 









2008:Q2 2008:Q3 2008:Q4 2009:Q1
 
 
Note: The solid bars are our baseline estimates from the survey responses of the contribution to the change 
in real PCE (at an annual rate) as reported in Table 12 and described in the text.  The whiskers on each bar 
represent the range of survey-based estimates reported in Table 13.   
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Actual Removes Rebate Income Removes Rebate Income and Spending
 
 
Note:  The actual data are from the BEA.  The figures removing the rebate are based on authors’ calculations as 
described in the text.  31
 









































Quarters since NBER Peak






Note: The ratio of revolving credit to spending is constructed with the nominal, seasonally adjusted aggregate of 
revolving consumer credit outstanding in the Federal Reserve Board’s G.19 Consumer Credit statistical release and 
the BEA’s nominal, seasonally adjusted estimate of PCE.  The quarter of the cyclical peaks is from the NBER.  For 
the current episode, the aggregate data are available only through 2009:Q2.  To construct the dashed line, we add 
estimated rebate-induced debt payment to the numerator and subtract estimated rebate-induced spending from the 
denominator and.   
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Feb-Apr May-Jun Nov-Dec Pooled
Percent of respondents with a plan:
  Spend 20% 19% 22% 20%
  Save 31% 27% 23% 28%
  Pay debt 49% 53% 55% 52%
Percent of all respondents:
  Did not get rebate 7% 9% 19% 11%
  Don't know plan for rebate 2% 2% 3% 3%
Memo:
Number of respondents 1,447 980 990 3,417
Table 1: Distribution of Survey Responses
Survey Month
Note: Authors' weighted tabulation of the Reuters/Michigan Survey of Consumers. The 
memo line provides the number of adult-household heads (or spouses) who participated 












Pay off     
debt
Row     
percent
Increase spending 38 6 14 20%
Increase saving 16 56 18 31%
Pay off debt 14 11 120 49%
Column percent 23% 25% 52% 100%
Responses in  Nov-Dec., Frequencies
Note: Weighted frequencies of the 295 respondents who report a use for the rebate 
in both interviews (May-June and Nov-Dec).







Switch to Not 
Spending
Change in personal circumstances 43% 43%
Change in economic conditions 10% 22%
Rebate less than expected 2% 11%
No reason / don't know 46% 24%
Table 2b: Reasons for Switching Responses
Percent of Group
Note: There were 30 respondents who switched to spending and 21 who 
switched to not spending between their first and second interviews.  Another 
group of 29 respondents (not shown) switched between saving and debt 
repayment.  34





Within a few weeks 36% 48% 57%
Within 1-3 months 50% 31% 25%
More than 3 months 14% 22% 18%
Memo:
Don’t know timing 9% 16% 18%
Percent increase spending* 22% 21% 20%
* Percent of rebate recipients.
Note: Author's weighted tabulations of individuals who mostly increased 
their spending in response to the rebate.  The top panel excludes 
individuals who did not report the timing of their increase in spending.  
There are 156 individuals who spent the rebate and report a timing of 
which 42 are with low income (income less than $40,000) and 37 with low 
asset (no stocks).
Table 3: Timing of Spending Response
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Specific Type of Spending
Major household item (durables, appliances) 25% 12% 38%
Other specific expenses 56% 54% 57%
   Food 10% 20% 0%
   Gasoline, fuel 2% 4% 0%
   Clothing 8% 9% 7%
   Recreation (incl. travel) 21% 8% 34%
   Housing-related expenses (incl. renovations) 9% 7% 11%
   Vehicle-related (incl. purchases and repairs) 3% 2% 4%
   Medical, education, other specific expenses 2% 4% 1%
General expenses 17% 31% 2%
Pay off credit card or other loan, pay taxes 3% 3% 2%
Memo:
Percent don't know type of spending 3% 5% 2%
Percent of all spenders in this group 100% 50% 50%
Note: The table gives the distribution of spending by type based on free responses.  The first column gives 
the distribution of spending for all spenders.  The second two columns give the distribution according to 
whether they responded “regular expense” or “something else” to the initial question on type of spending.  




Table 4: Type of Spending with Tax Rebate











Credit card 51% 37% 37%
Mortgage, home equity 9% 7% 7%
Specific bills (medical, tuition) 26% 31% 32%
Everyday bills (utilities, fuel), other debt 14% 25% 24%
Memo:
Don't know type of debt 2% 4% 4%
Percent pay off debt* 55% 62% 64%
Table 5: Type of Debt Paid Off with Tax Rebate
(Percent of respondents who mostly paid off debt with the rebate)
Note: There are 400 individuals in the top panel who said that the rebates led them 
to mostly to pay off debt and report the type of debt paid off of which 141 are with 
low income (income less than $40,000) and 141 with low asset (no stocks).
* Percent of rebate recipients.
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Spend Save Pay Debt No Rebate p-value
Age (years) (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
   U n d e r  3 0 8 %61 23 52 0 1 1 %
   30-39  18% 25 31 94 20 17%
   49-49 21% 41 31 93 40 25% 0.059
   50-64 29% 46 47 122 66 21%
   65 and over 24% 49 59 80 45 26%
   Under 65 76% 117 120 345 144 20% 0.104
   65 and over 24% 49 59 80 45 26%
Note: Tabulations of Nov-Dec surveys only.  Percents in columns A and F are calculated over respondents 
who reported a plan for the rebate.   The values in columns B through E are weighted counts.  Column G is 
the p-value for the test that the spending rates are equal within the group.
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Spend Save Pay Debt No Rebate p-value
Income and wealth (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Household Income
$0 to $20,000 15% 20 14 67 44 20%
$20,001 to $35,000 16% 29 25 78 21 22%
$35,001 to $50,000 14% 21 36 65 8 17% 0.208
$50,001 to $75,000 17% 27 33 95 13 17%
More than $75,000 33% 59 58 106 92 26%
Refused / Don't know 
income 5% 11 13 13 14 30%
Stocks
No stocks 33% 48 36 152 75 20%
Owns Stocks 67% 115 140 267 115 22%
$1 to $15,000 13% 21 22 68 11 19% 0.078
$15,001 to $50,000 14% 24 26 73 11 19%
$50,001 to $100,000 10% 11 23 45 12 14%
$100,000 to $250,000 11% 20 28 31 23 25%
More than $250,000 9% 19 19 11 39 39%
Refused / Don't know 
stock value 11% 20 22 39 19 25%
Refused / Don't know 
stock ownership 1% 3 3 6 1 27%
Note: Tabulations of Nov-Dec surveys only.  Percents in columns A and F are calculated over respondents who reported a 
plan for the rebate.   The values in columns B through E are weighted frequencies.  Column G is the p-value for the test that 
the spending rates are equal within the group.
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Spend Save Pay Debt p-value
How payment received (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Mail 49% 77 100 188 21% 0.897
Direct deposit 51% 82 77 220 22%
Frequencies
Note: Percents in columns A and E are calculated over respondents who reported a plan for the rebate 
and the form in which it was distrbuted.   The values in columns B through D are weighted counts.   
Column F is the p-value for the test that the spending rates are equal within the group.
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Spend Save Pay Debt No Rebate p-value
Financial conditions (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Financial condition 
compared to last year
Better 20% 34 38 90 27 21%
S a m e 2 1 % 3 95 17 44 2 2 4 % 0 . 7 2 4
Worse 59% 92 90 261 122 21%
Financial condition 
expected next year
Better 26% 39 40 119 47 20%
Same 55% 86 104 216 102 21% 0.341
Worse 19% 38 33 70 34 27%
Income expected next 
year
Higher 53% 93 90 227 96 23%
S a m e 2 3 % 4 24 59 64 1 2 3 % 0 . 4 2 1
Lower 24% 31 43 97 54 18%
Note: Tabulations of Nov-Dec surveys only.  Percents in columns A and F are calculated over respondents who 
reported a plan for the rebate.   The values in columns B through E are weighted frequencies.  Column G is the p-
value for the test that the spending rates are equal within the group.
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Nov-Dec
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Demographics
   Married -3.5 0.8 0.8 0.8
(3.6) (1.8) (1.8) (1.8)
   Children -5.5 -1.3 -1.1 -1.0
(4.4) (2.0) (2.0) (2.0)
   Age 30 to 39 6.9 2.6 2.5 2.7
(6.1) (3.1) (3.1) (3.1)
   Age 40 to 49 12.4 5.6 5.8 6.1
(6.2) (3.1) (3.0) (3.0)
   Age 50 to 64 6.1 6.6 7.4 7.7
(6.4) (3.2) (3.2) (3.2)
   Age 65 and over 10.3 15.6 16.8 17.2
(6.8) (3.5) (3.5) (3.5)
Household income
   $20,001 to $35,000 2.9 2.8 2.4 2.6
(5.9) (3.0) (3.0) (3.0)
   $35,001 to $50,000 -1.1 -0.9 -1.1 -1.1
(6.1) (3.1) (3.1) (3.1)
   $50,001 to $75,000 0.0 0.5 -0.2 -0.2
(6.1) (3.1) (3.1) (3.1)
   More than $75,000 8.5 4.9 4.5 4.6
(6.7) (3.3) (3.4) (3.4)
   Did not report income 8.5 7.4 8.1 8.1
(9.6) (4.3) (4.4) (4.4)
Expected income growth g
   g > 0 2.9
(2.0)
   g < 0 -2.8
(2.3)
   g > 4% 3.9
(2.2)
   0 < g < 4% 1.7
(2.2)
  -10% < g < 0 -0.8
(2.8)
   g < -10% -5.1
(2.8)
Table 10: Multivariate Analysis
Pooled 
(Table 10 continues on next page)
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Nov-Dec
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Household stock wealth
   $1 to $15,000 0.7 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2
(5.2) (2.6) (2.6) (2.6)
   $15,001 to $50,000 -1.2 2.0 2.4 2.5
(5.1) (2.6) (2.6) (2.6)
   $50,001 to $100,000 -7.7 0.9 1.2 1.2
(5.1) (3.0) (3.0) (3.0)
   $100,000 to $250,000 2.1 4.9 5.1 5.2
(6.0) (3.0) (3.0) (3.0)
   More than $250,000 14.3 4.9 5.2 5.2
(8.3) (3.5) (3.5) (3.5)
   Did not report stock value 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
(6.0) (3.0) (3.0) (3.0)
Survey month
   March 0.8 0.8 0.7
(2.8) (2.7) (2.7)
   April 3.1 3.5 3.5
(2.8) (2.8) (2.8)
   May -0.9 -0.5 -0.5
(2.7) (2.7) (2.7)
   June 3.3 3.6 3.5
(2.8) (2.8) (2.8)
   November 4.3 5.0 5.0
(3.0) (3.0) (3.0)
   December -2.6 1.9 2.5 2.4
(3.2) (2.9) (2.9) (2.8)
Constant 15.3 7.4 5.6 5.3
(7.9) (4.0) (4.2) (4.2)
Number of observations 769 2,921 2,909 2,909
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
Table 10-Continued: Multivariate Analysis
Pooled 
 
Note:  Dependent variable equals 100 if the respondent reports mostly spending the payment and zero if the 
respondent reports mostly saving or mostly paying off debt.  The pooled results are for the surveys in February 
through June and November and December.  Regression based on weighted data.  Standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity in parentheses.   




Spending "Within  
1-3 Months"
Spending "More than 
3 Months Later"
In month of receipt 40% 36% 4% .13
1st month after 30% 30% .10
2nd month after 16% 16% .05
3rd month after 8% 8% .03
4th month after 3% 3% .01
5th month after 2% 2% .01
6th month after 1% 1% .00
Total 100% 36% 50% 14% 0.33
Memo: Summary
Within first 3 months 86% 36% 50% 0% 0.29
More than 3 months 14% 0% 0% 14% 0.05
Percent of Spending Total Fraction 
of Rebate 
Spent
Note: MPC estimates based on survey responses as described in the text.
Table 11:  Presumed Monthly Spending Pattern Based on Survey Responses  44
 
Income Spending Income Spending
2008:Q2 312 62 12.0% 2.4%
2008:Q3 62 55 -8.9% -0.3%
2008:Q4 9 10 -2.0% -1.7%
2009:Q1 0 1 0.0% -0.3%
Table 12: Estimate of Aggregate Income and Spending from 
the Rebate at an Annual Rate
Billions of             
Dollars, a.r.
Contribution to Real 
Percent Change, a.r.
Note: The source for the income data is the BEA.  Estimates of rebate 
spending are the authors' calculations using the survey-based MPCs in 
Table 11.  
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MPC .25 .25 .25 .33 .33 .33 .40 .40 .40
Timing Slower Baseline Faster Slower Baseline Faster Slower Baseline Faster
2 0 0 8 : Q 2 4 24 65 05 662 66 67 74 79
2 0 0 8 : Q 3 4 44 14 05 955 53 71 66 63
2008:Q4 8 7 6 11 10 81 3 1 29
2009:Q1 1 1 1 1 1 1211
Table 13: Alternate Estimates of Rebate Spending  
Billions of Dollars (Annual Rate)
Note: The smaller MPC of 0.25 assumes that "mostly spenders" have MPC of 0.8 and "mostly save/pay debt" have 
MPC of 0.1, where the 0.1 MPC is roughly a straight-line amortizing of the rebate income over 10 years.  The larger 
MPC of 0.40 uses the follow-up questions that raise "mostly spend to 29 percent.  Otherwise calculation is same as 
MPC of 0.33 from 22 percent mostly spend.  The timing assumptions vary the assignment of the broad timing 
categories to monthly timing assumptions.    46
2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4
(1) Published national accounts data  -0.6 0.1 -3.5 -3.1
(2) Dynamic model simulation excluding rebate income 0.5 -2.2 0.5 -2.4
(3) Difference between data and model simulation -1.1 2.2 -4.0 -0.7
(4) Contribution of rebates to the change in real PCE 
estimated from responses in the Michigan survey 0.0 2.4 -0.3 -1.7
Table 14: Estimated Rebate Spending Effects
Percent Change in Real PCE (a.r.)
Note: The dynamic model of the change in real PCE is estimated with data through 2007:Q4.  The model is 
simulated starting in 2008:Q1 with the model's prediction of the lagged change in real PCE and the estimated gap 
from target spending, as well as the actual real disposable personal income excluding the tax rebates, household 
net worth, the real Fed Funds rate, the change in the unemployment rate, and consumer sentiment.  The simulation 
results are reported in line 2.  The contributions of the rebates to the change in real PCE in line 4 are the survey-
based estimates reported in Table 12.  
 
 











Credit Card Debt 
Paid Down
96 32 64 19 45 23
Table 15: Estimates of Aggregate Impact of Rebates
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Pollster Interview Date Question Spend Save Pay Debt Other
1.  Fox News / Opinion 
Dynamics
Jan 30 - 31 If you received a tax rebate in the next few 
months, what do you think you would do 
with the money -- save it or spend it?
900 53 37 -- 10
2.  Harris Interactive 
for CCH Complete Tax
Jan 30 - Feb 1 If you were to get a tax rebate, which of 
the following would you be most likely to 
do with all or most of the money?
2,020 21 32 47 --
3.  Washington Post / 
ABC News*
Jan 30 - Feb 1 If you get a federal rebate, what will you 
most likely do with it?
1,249 24 36 35 4
4.  Zogby International 
for TransUnion 
TrueCredit.com*
Jan 30 - Feb 1 If you were to get a tax rebate, which of 
the following would you be most likely to 
do with all or most of the money?
3,036 24 29 45 3
5.  Pew Research 
Center
Jan 30 - Feb 2 If you receive a cash rebate from the 
government, how are you most likely to 
use the money? Are you most likely to 
spend it, save it, pay off bills, or 
something else?
1,502 20 24 49 7
6.  Bloomberg / 
LATimes
Feb 21 - 25 When you get your rebate check, will you 
spend it on purchases, or will you pay 
down some of your debt, or will you put it 
in your savings account?
1,408 23 38 35 6
7.  CNN/Opinion 
Research Corp.
Mar 14 - 16 If you receive a tax rebate, what will you 
do with the money -- spend it, save it, pay 
off bills, or donate it to charity?
1,019 21 32 41 3
8.  Harris Interactive* April 7 - 15 How much money (in dollars) do you 
think you will use for the following?
2,529 40 25 30 5
9.  Washington Post / 
ABC News*
April 10 - 13 If you get a federal rebate, what will you 
most likely do with it?
1,197 26 37 35 3
10. CBS News / New 
York Times
Apr 25 - 27 What do you expect to do with the tax 
rebate money you receive- will you spend 
it, use it to pay bills, or save or invest it?
664 19 28 53 --
11. Zogby 
International*
May 6 - 8 How do you  plan to spend the majority of 
your 2008 tax rebate?
7,815 34 25 32 9
12. Harris Interactive* Aug 11 - 17 How much money (in dollars) did you use 
for the following?
2,710 39 20 35 5
Sahm-Shapiro-
Slemrod (2009)
Feb - Jun,       
Nov - Dec
Did the tax rebate lead you mostly to 
increase spending, mostly to increase 
saving, or mostly pay off debt?
3,417 20 28 52 --
   Note for #8: Multiple answers in 0%, 1-25%, 25-50%, 51-75%, 75-100% categories catgorized and recalculated by authors to add to 100%.
   Note for #9: Open-ended answers aggregated by authors.
   Note for #11: The 34% spend rate consists of 26% who only spend  on everyday expenses and 8% who would "splurge."
   Note for #12: Multiple answers in 0%, 1-25%, 25-50%, 51-75%, 75-100% categories catgorized and recalculated by authors to add to 100%.
Number of 
Respondents
Table 16: Comparison with Other Surveys
Percent of Responses
* Note for #3: Open-ended answers aggregated by authors.
   Note for #4: The 24% spend rate consists of 18% who would buy something necessary and 6% who would "splurge."
 
 
 
 